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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY: VENEZUELA’S REFERRAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
 




Economic sanctions, unilateral and multilateral, have a long pedigree in international 
relations.  From South Africa2 and Israel,3 to Iraq,4 Iran5 and North Korea,6 such measures 
have, with varying results, been used in diverse contexts to influence the behaviour of States.7 
Some would celebrate the use of economic sanctions as a means of punishing “rogue States” 
for human rights violations or threats to the peace,8 while others would condemn it as 
“imperialism” by powerful States against the weak.9  Leaving aside Chapter VII enforcement 
action by the UN Security Council,10 the imposition of unilateral sanctions raises far-reaching 
questions in respect of the rights and duties of States under international law.11  A novel issue 
that has emerged recently is whether, in certain circumstances, such measures could even 
qualify as crimes against humanity.  
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This issue has arisen in the context of sanctions adopted by the United States (and other 
States) against Venezuela.  Pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC Statute”),12 on September 26, 2018, six States referred the situation in 
Venezuela to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (“Referral I”), accusing the 
Government of President Nicolás Maduro of having committed human rights abuses 
amounting to crimes against humanity.13 Following this referral, on February 13, 2020, 
Venezuela submitted a competing, second referral (“Referral II”),14 alleging that economic 
sanctions adopted by the United States (and other States) against Venezuela constitute crimes 
against humanity.15 
 
The US sanctions are far-reaching. Their stated objectives included the removal of President 
Nicolás Maduro from office, and counteracting what the United States considered to be: 
 
“human rights abuses, including arbitrary or unlawful arrest and detention of 
Venezuelan citizens, interference with freedom of expression, including for members 
of the media, and ongoing attempts to undermine Interim President Juan Guaidó and 
the Venezuelan National Assembly’s exercise of legitimate authority in Venezuela.”16  
 
The first round of sanctions were imposed through Executive Order 13,808 on August 24, 
2017;17 those measures prohibited US individuals and entities from dealing with the 
 
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, art. 53(1)(a) (entered into 
force July 1, 2002). 
13 See Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I, Referral of the situation in Venezuela under Article 
14 of the Rome Statute submitted by the Republic of Argentina, Canada, the Republic of Colombia, the 
Republic of Chile, the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Peru (Sept. 26, 2018) (International Criminal 
Court), online: ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/180925-otp-referral-venezuela_ENG.pdf>. 
Referral I alleged the commission of crimes against humanity by Venezuelan officials, based primarily on the 
May 29, 2018 Report of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States and the Panel of 
Independent Experts on the Possible Commission of Crimes against Humanity in Venezuela, OEA/Ser.D/XV.19 
(2018), online: <http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Panel-Independiente-Venezuela-EN.pdf>.   
14 Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela II, ICC-01/20, Referral pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome 
Statute to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with 
respect to Unilateral Coercive Measures (Mar. 4, 2020), online: ICC <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2020_00802.PDF> (“Referral II”). 
15 Referrals I and II were, on February 19, 2020, assigned to ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III on the grounds that “the 
two referrals appear to overlap geographically and temporally and may warrant assignment to the same Pre-
Trial Chamber.” Decision assigning the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela II and reassigning the 
Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I to Pre-Trial Chamber III (19 February 2020) at 3 
(International Criminal Court, The Presidency), Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I, ICC-02/18, 
online: ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00598.PDF>; Situation in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela II, ICC-01/20, online: ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00596.pdf>. 
16 Michael Crowley & Anatoly Kurmanaev, Trump Imposes New Sanctions on Venezuela, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2019, at A6. 
17 Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 24, 2017). 
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Venezuelan government and its state-owned oil company PDVSA.18 Subsequently, on 
February 2519 and March 1, 2018,20 targeted sanctions were imposed on officials aligned with 
the Maduro government.21 In April 2019, the United States reinforced its economic 
sanctions,22 through the targeting of Venezuelan–Cuban oil shipments,23 as well as the 
financial transactions of the Central Bank of Venezuela.24  
 
The sanctions have been described as follows: 
 
“Although the Trump administration’s campaign of economic sanctions has 
effectively drained most avenues for funding by Maduro’s government, the Trump 
administration has consistently exempted humanitarian assistance and insisted that the 
sanctions ‘do not target the innocent people of Venezuela.’ Despite this assertion, 
Venezuela’s economic situation has worsened severely under the prolonged sanctions, 
and the humanitarian crisis remains devastating.”25 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the 
enjoyment of human rights, Ms. Alena Douhan, reported in 2021 that the Venezuelan 
Government’s revenue has contracted by 99%,26 and that “[i]mpediments to food imports … 
have resulted in the steady growth of malnourishment.”27  The UN World Food Programme 
has reported that while 70% of Venezuelans “report that food is always available . . . access 
 
18 See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 103, 103 (2018).  
19 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions Governors of Venezuelan States Aligned with 
Maduro (Feb. 25, 2019), at <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-governors-of-venezuelan-states-
aligned-with-maduro>. 
20 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions Illegitimate Maduro Regime Security Officials 
Associated with Violence and Obstruction of International Humanitarian Assistance (Mar. 1, 2019), at 
<https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-illegitimate-madure-regime-security-officials-associated-
with-violence-and-obstruction-of-international-humanitarian-assistance>. 
21 See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 601, 606 (2019). 
22 Id. at 606. 
23 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions Companies Enabling Shipment of Venezuelan 
Oil to Cuba (Apr. 5, 2019), at <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-companies-enabling-
shipment- of-venezuelan-oil-to-cuba>. 
24 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, The United States Takes Action To End Cuba’s Malign Influence on 
Venezuela (Apr. 12, 2019), at <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-takes-action-to-end-cubas-malign-
influence-on-venezuela>; U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions the Central Bank of 
Venezuela (Apr. 17, 2019), at <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-the-central-bank-of-
venezuela>. 
25 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 601, 608 (2019). 
26 Preliminary findings of the visit to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by the Special Rapporteur on the 




to food is difficult as the prices are too high when compared to household income,”28 amidst 
accusations that “a vast corruption network … has enabled [the] Maduro … regime to 
significantly profit from food imports and distribution in Venezuela.”29  
There is no doubt that the aim of the Trump administration was—to adopt Sir Anthony 
Eden’s metaphor for Colonel Nasser’s capacity to impose an oil blockade against Great 
Britain during the 1955–56 Suez Crisis—to put a thumb on Venezuela’s windpipe.30 This 
policy has no doubt had a devastating impact. The question for present purposes is whether it 
is in violation of international law and, more specifically, whether it constitutes crimes 
against humanity.   
 
Although the United States has not set out the legal basis for the sanctions under international 
law, they appear to have been adopted, in part, in response to human rights abuses. It is not 
clear however, whether they constitute countermeasures, retorsions, or some other category.  
For its part, Venezuela’s Referral II alleges that the US sanctions are, first, a breach of 
general international law and, second, amount to crimes against humanity under Article 7 of 
the ICC Statute. If the first assertion is one that is sometimes heard in international law,31 the 
second is entirely novel and has far-reaching implications for the rights and obligations of 
States, including in respect of peremptory norms.32 
 
The present article considers whether Venezuela’s legal arguments in Referral II are 
consistent with general international law and the ICC Statute.  It is not intended to be a 
general exposition on international law and economic sanctions; furthermore, it does not 
address in detail Venezuela’s factual assertions in respect of the United States’ sanctions.  
Instead, it focuses on the specific question of whether and in what circumstances sanctions 
 
28 WFP Venezuela Food Security Assessment, p. 3 (February 23, 2020), at 
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Main%20Findings%20WFP%20Food%20Security%20
Assessment%20in%20Venezuela_January%202020-2.pdf>. 
29 US Treasury Disrupts Corruption Network Stealing From Venezuela’s Food Distribution Program, (July 25, 
2019), at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm741>. 
30 See SIR ANTHONY EDEN, FULL CIRCLE: THE MEMOIRS OF SIR ANTHONY EDEN 426 (1960); ALEX VON 
TUNZELMAN, BLOOD AND SAND: SUEZ, HUNGARY, AND THE CRISIS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 19 (2016). 
31 See, e.g., the argument by Nicaragua in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14. 
32 Referral II is currently at the Preliminary Examination stage, which is “a process of examining the 
information available in order to reach a fully informed determination on whether there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation pursuant to the criteria established by the Rome Statute.” In particular, under 
Article 53(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, the Prosecutor must consider whether: “The information available to the 
Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is 
being committed”. 
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violate international law, and what implications this has on whether such measures qualify as 
crimes against humanity. Following the present introduction, Section II considers “Sanctions 
Under International Law,” focusing on Venezuela’s arguments that, as a matter of general 
international law, it is unlawful to impose “unilateral coercive measures.” Section III 
considers Venezuela’s contentions that imposition of sanctions, in the circumstances 
described above, amount to the commission of crimes against humanity.33  This analysis is 
followed by brief conclusions, in Section IV, on the implications of the application of 
established doctrines of international law to such novel circumstances. 
 
II. SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Section 4 of Referral II is entitled “Illegality of Unilateral Coercive Measures.”34  It sets forth 
Venezuela’s position on the lawfulness of “unilateral coercive measures”—commonly 
referred to as “sanctions” in international law—as a predicate to its contentions regarding 
crimes against humanity. The present Section analyzes the most relevant authorities relied 
upon by Venezuela in support of its contentions and considers whether its claims are 
consistent with international law. Referral II makes a number of creative arguments relating 
to sanctions and crimes against humanity that are as yet untried. As set out below, its 
extensive reliance on sources that are at best “soft law,”35 or simply devoid of any authority, 
does not withstand scrutiny in light of well-established doctrines of international law. 
 
UN Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 
Venezuela maintains that the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
October 24, 1970 (“Friendly Relations Declaration”)36 lays down a prohibition of unilateral 
economic sanctions.37 The Declaration, which was famously adopted by consensus, sets out 
 
33 Referral II, supra note 14, paras. 40–52 and 70–115 respectively. 
34 Referral II, supra note 14, at 19–24. 
35 See Alan Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law 48 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 901 
(1999). 
36 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UNGAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 
18, UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV) (1970) 121 (“Friendly Relations Declaration”). 
37 Referral II, supra note 14, para. 40. 
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seven “basic principles of international law” that are considered to be authoritative 
interpretations of the UN Charter38 and a codification of customary international law.39  
As Referral II recognizes, the issue is addressed in the ninth preambular paragraph of the 
Declaration, which recalls: 
 
“the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, 
political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political 
independence or territorial integrity of any State.”40 
 
The reason this appears only in the Preamble—and not among the “basic principles of 
international law”—is that there was no agreement between States on the question of 
economic coercion.41 The Preamble sets out “views which did not find the necessary 
consensus to be included in the main text” and even its relevance for the interpretation of the 
principles has been regarded as “doubtful.”42  In any event, the preambular paragraph does no 
more than “acknowledge the existence of a duty not to use economic coercion for the purpose 
of destroying or dismembering a State,”43 rather than setting out a duty of wider application. 
 Although Referral II does not mention it, the Declaration provides in its Third 
Principle that: “No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.” Brownlie 
observed of this provision that it “is by no means easy to apply.”44 In any event, the crux of 
the matter is the term “coerce,” on which a great deal turns.  
As to the exact relationship between intervention and coercion, the editors of Oppenheim 
observed that, “to constitute intervention the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or 
otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter 
 
38 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 36. 
39 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 ICJ REP. 403, 437 (July 22, 2010); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 101–103; Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, 83 ILR 1, 74 (Barberis, 
Bedjaoui, Gros, 1989). 
40 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 36, Preamble, para. 9. 
41 Helen Keller, Friendly Relations Declaration (1970), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 8 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online ed. 2009), at http://www.mpepil.com and Robert 
Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 
AJIL 713, 717 (1971). 
42 Keller, supra note 41, para 8; also Rosenstock, supra note 41, at 717. 
43 Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some Aspects), 162 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 307 (1995). 
44 Id. 306. 
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in question. Interference pure and simple is not intervention.”45 Measures such as suspending 
exports or a boycott of products will—although they are intended to persuade the target State 
to pursue, or cease, a particular course of conduct—be pressure that “falls short of being 
dictatorial and does not amount to intervention.”46 It is true, as Cleveland has observed, that 
customary international law has traditionally “allowed States to use economic coercion for a 
wide range of purposes.”47 “Nothing in customary international law,” she correctly 
concludes, as a general proposition, “appears to bar the use of economic coercion.”48 
As mentioned above, the stated objectives of the sanctions against Venezuela include 
counteracting what the United States considered to be human rights abuses, including 
arbitrary or unlawful arrest.49 The proposition that there is nothing in customary international 
law that bars economic coercion applies a fortiori to matters which are not considered to be 
solely within the State’s domestic jurisdiction (“domaine réservé”). In order to be 
inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention, conduct must not only be coercive, but 
also concern “matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, 
to decide freely”.50 Arbitrary arrest and otherwise inhuman and degrading treatment are 
examples of matters that fall outside the State’s domaine réservé .51 The principle of State 
sovereignty does not (any more) let States decide freely on matters relating to fundamental 
human rights. 
 
Beyond the principle of non-intervention, however, general international law contains few, if 
any, obligations in this regard. Unless a State has bound itself through particular treaty 
commitments or other specific legal obligations to continue trade relations with another State, 
it is free to impose a trade embargo. As Lowe and Tzanakopoulos have put it, “in the absence 
 
45 SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL I 432 (9th ed., 1992); 
see also Lady Fox, The State, in SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 51, 65 (Sir Ivor Roberts ed, 7th ed., 2017). 
46 Jennings & Watts, supra note 45, at 434. 
47 Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L 1, 53 (2001). 
48 Id. See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over 
Domestic Affairs, 83 AJIL 1, 39–42 (1989); Gerhard Hafner, Bemerkungen zur Funktion und Bestimmung der 
Betroffenheit im Völkerrecht anhand des Binnenstaates, 31 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 187, 226 (1988). 
49 Michael Crowley & Anatoly Kurmanaev, Trump Imposes New Sanctions on Venezuela, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2019, at A6. 
50 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 108 (para. 
205). 
51 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. DRC), 2010 ICJ REP. 639, 671 (para. 87) (“the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading treatment is among the rules of general international law which are binding on States in all 
circumstances, even apart from any treaty commitments”); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran  (US v. Iran), ICJ REP. 3, 42 (para. 91) (“[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to 
subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the … 
fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”). 
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of specific legal obligations to engage in trade with another State, a general trade embargo 
may be a lawful measure”; the act would be “unfriendly but lawful.”52 Thus, in Nicaragua, 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) found that although they were not inconsistent with 
the principle of non-intervention, some of “the acts of economic pressure” at issue in the case 
were in breach of the object and purpose of the treaty of friendship and commerce between 
Nicaragua and the United States: 
 
“A State is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees fit to 
do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other specific legal obligation; but 
where there exists such a commitment, of the kind implied in a treaty of friendship 
and commerce, such an abrupt act of termination of commercial intercourse as the 
general trade embargo of 1 May 1985 will normally constitute a violation of the 
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.”53 
 
On the other hand, other leading commentators have espoused a broader view. Mani has 
observed that the definition of “intervention” set out above is a strict one, implying that it is 
too strict.54 Tladi has similarly observed that the threshold of intervention has been met when 
a State compels another “to change its policy or cause of action, not through influence or 
persuasion but through threats or imposition of negative consequences.”55 White has argued 
that States have no unilateral form of autonomous sanctioning power: only collective 
sanctions can be lawful in international law.56 These views coincide with those put forward 
by a number of States, both in the context of UN resolutions and State practice, which is 
addressed below. 
 
The principle of non-intervention 
Venezuela’s Referral II does not address the rights and obligations of States under general 
international law, including, in particular, the principle of non-intervention, which is 
especially relevant to coercive measures among States. It is evident that, in principle, every 
 
52 Vaughan Lowe & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Economic Warfare, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 37 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online ed. 2013), at <http://www.mpepil.com>. 
53 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 138 (para. 
276). 
54  Venkateswara Subramanian Mani, Humanitarian Intervention Today, 313 RECUEIL DES COURS 207 (2005). 
55 Dire Tladi, The Duty Not to Intervene in Matters within Domestic Jurisdiction, in THE UN FRIENDLY 
RELATIONS DECLARATION AT 50: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
87, 92 (Jorge E. Viñuales ed, 2020). 
56 Nigel D. White, Autonomous and Collective Sanctions in the International Legal Order, 27 Italian Y.B. Int’l 
L. 3, 24 (2017). 
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State can freely decide the manner in which it enters into economic relations with others.57 In 
that regard, as Waldock pointed out, “the operation of political and economic pressures is 
part of the normal working of the relations between States”.58 As mentioned above, the ICJ 
considered in the Nicaragua case whether the United States was “responsible for an ‘indirect’ 
form of intervention in its internal affairs inasmuch as it has taken, to Nicaragua’s 
disadvantage, certain action of an economic nature”.59 This involved the termination of 
economic aid; a 90 per cent reduction in the sugar quota for United States imports from 
Nicaragua; and a trade embargo.60 The US sanctions policy against Nicaragua has rightly 
been described as “a total trade embargo”.61 Nicaragua argued that the measures constituted 
“a systematic violation of the principle of non-intervention”.62 The ICJ concluded, however, 
that, even in these extreme circumstances, it was “unable to regard such action on the 
economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of non-
intervention”.63  
 
As leading commentators have pointed out, the unilateral measures imposed by the United 
States that were “at issue in Nicaragua and found not to breach the principle of non-
intervention are the most common, and potentially most severe, economic actions that can be 
employed against a state”.64 
 
Vienna Declaration of 1993 
Venezuela relies on paragraph 31 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action65 (“Vienna Declaration”), which called: 
 
“upon States to refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations that creates obstacles to 
trade relations among States and impedes the full realization of the human rights 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human 
 
57 Thouvenin, supra note 77 at 171. 
58 “Second report on the law of treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur” in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1963, vol. 2, ILC, 15th Sess., Agenda Item No. 1, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1 at 52, para 6 (1963). 
59 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 125–126 
(para. 244). 
60 Id. at 126 (para. 244). 
61 Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-intervention 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 370 (2009). 
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 126 (para. 
244). 
63 Id. at 126 (para. 245). 
64 Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 61. 
65 Referral II, supra note 14, para. 40. 
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rights instruments, in particular the rights of everyone to a standard of living 
adequate for their health and well-being, including food and medical care, housing 
and the necessary social services.”66 
 
Notwithstanding that such declarations are not binding,67 the Vienna Declaration merely 
confirms that “unilateral measures” should be consistent with international law. It does not 
state that economic sanctions as such are unlawful.  In fact, in 1993, the same year as the 
Declaration’s adoption, a Note prepared by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
entitled Economic Measures as means of Political and Economic Coercion against 
Developing Countries, concluded based on a study of State practice that: 
 
“[t]here is no clear consensus in international law as to when coercive 
economic measures are improper, despite relevant treaties, declarations and 
resolutions adopted in international organizations which try to develop norms 
limiting the use of such measures.”68 
 
Other non-binding instruments  
Not relied on by Venezuela, but more to the point than the Vienna Declaration, are a number 
of more recent declarations and statements on the question of unilateral sanctions. In a Joint 
Declaration on the promotion of international law, the People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation expressed the view that the “imposition of unilateral coercive measures 
not based on international law” was an example of the imposition by some States of their will 
on other States,69 that could potentially “defeat the objects and purposes of measures imposed 
by the Security Council, and undermine their integrity and effectiveness”.70 The element “not 
based on international law” is no doubt key to understanding the Sino-Russian position. The 
same wording was used in a statement, from April 2014, by China, Russia, and India, 
referring to “[g]ood faith implementation of principles of sovereign equality of States, non-
intervention in the internal affairs of States and cooperation excludes imposition of unilateral 
 
66 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, GA Res 48/121, UNGAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49 UN 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 31 (1993). 
67 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226, 254–255 (July 8, 
1996). 
68 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Economic measures as means of political and economic coercion against developing 
countries, Note, UNGAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 91(a), UN Doc. A/48/535, para 2 (1993). 
69 Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International 




coercive measures not based on international law.”71 Despite their significance, it would be 
difficult to maintain that such statements, along with resolutions of the General Assembly to 
the same effect,72 have crystallized a new rule of customary international law. As one 
commentator puts it, it might “be questioned whether State practice comports with the high-
minded statements of the General Assembly”: an obvious example is the embargo of 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973–74 against Canada, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States for their support of Israel in the Six 
Days War.73 Similarly, China’s State practice seems not to comport with the words of the 
Joint Sino-Russian Declaration, as China has begun to impose unilateral sanctions of exactly 
the kind denigrated in the Joint Declaration.74 It is generally accepted, no doubt correctly, that 
a rule of customary international law against economic sanctions does not exist.75 
 
Whether sanctions may be imposed only by a competent international organ 
Venezuela goes on to assert that for sanctions to be lawful they must be imposed by a 
competent international organ, such as the UN Security Council.76 This is wrong. 
International law recognizes the right of States to adopt unilateral measures against other 
States,77 whether acting alone or with others, in respect of either unlawful, or merely 
unfriendly conduct, in order to induce the other State to change its conduct.78 To deny this is 
to misunderstand the nature of international law, which in spite of the multilateralization of 
recent decades, remains essentially “a network of bilateral relations.”79 
 
71 Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of 
India and the People’s Republic of China, para. 6, April, 19, 2016, at 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1356652.shtml>. 
72 See, e.g., “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States”, GA Res. 2131 
(XX) (Dec. 21, 1965); “Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States”, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12, 
1974); and “Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing 
Countries”, GA Res. 46/210 (Dec. 20, 1991) and subsequent annual reiterations. 
73  Matthew Happold, Introduction, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6 (Paul Eden & 
Matthew Happold ed, 2016). 
74 Patrick Wintour, China Imposes Sanctions on UK MPs, Lawyers and Academic in Xinjiang Row, THE 
GUARDIAN, March 26, 2021. 
75 Rebecca Barber, An Exploration of the General Assembly’s Troubled Relationship with Unilateral Sanctions, 
1, 35–36 INT’L & COMP. L. QUARTERLY (forthcoming). 
76 Referral II, supra note 14, para 41. 
77 Among numerous other authorities: Jean Combacau, Sanctions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 337, 338 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1986); JEAN SALMON, DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
1017 (2001); Thouvenin, supra note 12; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 12. 
78 Salmon, supra note 77. 
79 James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, 365 RECUEIL DES COURS 66 
(2013). 
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As Higgins explains, “[s]anctions are not an invention of the UN system; on the 
contrary, they have a long pedigree in the history of inter-state relations.”80 Such measures 
come in the shape of countermeasures and retorsions.  As the UN International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) has observed, a State may take countermeasures against another State 
“which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to 
comply with its obligations”81 though subject to certain limits such as the protection of 
fundamental human rights.82 Countermeasures are, as the ICJ has observed, “among the 
circumstances capable of precluding the wrongfulness of an otherwise unlawful act in 
international law and are sometimes invoked as defences.”83 They “may have a coercive 
character”84 and, though they would otherwise be unlawful, their wrongfulness is precluded 
because their function or objective is to induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its 
obligations.85 Retorsion, by contrast, describes lawful measures that one State may take 
against another simply in response to an unfriendly act.86 As the ILC has stated, “acts of 
retorsion may include the prohibition of or limitations upon normal diplomatic relations or 
other contacts, embargoes of various kinds or withdrawal of voluntary aid programmes.”87  
 
It is thus incorrect to assert that only international organs may impose economic sanctions.88 
There is, in fact, extensive State practice supporting the unilateral right to impose economic 
sanctions. An example may be found in the 1993 Resolution of the European Parliament in 
relation to the Arab sanctions of Israel, which emphasized that under international law “every 
sovereign state is at liberty to take measures restricting trade in order to protect its national 
security interests.”89  Another example is the imposition of  unilateral economic sanctions by 
 
80 Higgins and others, supra note 10, at 981. As regards terminology, however, Francophone international 
lawyers have traditionally tended to reserve the term “sanctions” for Security Council- or General Assembly-
mandated action (but without questioning the general legality of, e.g., economic boycotts, suspension of arms 
shipments, and asset freezes), see CHARLES ROUSSEAU, LE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS 597–598 (1983). 
81 “Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts” in Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 2001, vol. 2, part 2, UNILCOR, 53rd Sess., UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (part 2) 129 
(2001) . 
82 Id. at 131. 
83 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar), Judgment of July 14, 2020, 
available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/173/judgments>, para. 49. 
84 ILC Draft articles on responsibility of States, supra note 68 at 70. 
85 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 572 (9th ed., 2019). 
86 JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 252–254 (13th ed., 2019). 
87 ILC Draft articles on responsibility of States, supra note 87, at 128. 
88 James Crawford, The Relationship between Sanctions and Countermeasures, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 57 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001). 
89 Resolution on the Arab economic boycott of Israel, supra note 3, at 48. 
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the Nordic countries against South Africa for its policy of apartheid.90 Similarly, the United 
States imposed unilateral sanctions against Iran in 1980 in connection with the hostage-taking 
of its diplomatic staff in Tehran,91 and against India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear 
weapons tests in 1998.92 Another example is the imposition of economic sanctions against 
Argentina by several States, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, following 
Argentina’s military action in the Malvinas/Falklands Islands in 1982.93 Yet another example 
is the United Kingdom’s unilateral sanctions regime relating to Burma (Myanmar), in force 
from December 31, 2020.94 None of these sanctions, imposed unilaterally by States, has been 
held to be inconsistent with international law. 
 
Human rights obligations under the UN Charter 
Venezuela also invokes human rights principles,95 which raises the question of the extent to 
which the UN Charter and UN human rights conventions impose obligations in respect of 
unilateral economic sanctions. Article 1(3) of the UN Charter provides that among the 
purposes of the United Nations is: “To achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.96 While it is an important statement 
of purpose,97 this provision does not actually set out the content of human rights obligations 
in any detail and, in any event, does not prohibit economic sanctions as such.  
 
Venezuela further invokes Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, which provide: 
 
Article 55 
“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination, the United 
Nations shall promote: … (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human 
 
90 See e.g. Jarna Petman, Resort to Economic Sanctions by Not Directly Affected States, in Picchio Forlati & 
Sicilianos, supra note 11, at 370–71. 
91 See e.g. Guillaume, supra note 5, at 197–218; Rousseau, supra note 80, at 597. 
92 See e.g.  Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law 93 AJIL 
470, 498–99 (1999). 
93 See, e.g., Guillaume, supra note 5, at 9–43. 
94 See <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-burma>. 
95 Referral II, supra note 14, paras 47–52. 
96 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 1 UNTS 16, art. 1(3) (entered into force October 24, 1945). 
97See Rüdiger Wolfrum, Purposes and Principles, Article 1, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY VOL. 1 (Bruno Simma and others eds, 3rd edn., 2012) 108 at 108, regards the provision as “more 
appropriate for political objectives rather than for legally binding obligations.” 
 14 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.”98 
 
Article 56 
“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55.”99 
 
Exactly what obligations are imposed by Articles 55–56 is a matter of contention.100 Member 
States are arguably under “at least a moral—and, however imperfect, a legal—duty to use 
their best efforts, either by agreement or, whenever possible, by enlightened action of their 
own judicial and other authorities, to act in support of a crucial purpose of the Charter”.101 In 
that sense, it may even be said that these provisions “legally obligate” Member States “to 
respect and protect human rights”,102 and that they impose “the legal obligation on member 
States singly or jointly to stand up for respecting human rights”.103  But, crucially, “human 
rights still have to be filled with substance either by means of conventions or customary 
international law”.104 In other words, the manner in which States comply with Articles 55–56 
is through compliance with conventions and rules of customary international law to which 
they have consented to be bound. These human rights obligations are considered below.  
 
The UN Human Rights Covenants 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)105 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)106 both provide, in common 
Article 1(2), that: “In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”107 
This obligation relates to the right of a people exercising self-determination freely to dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources.108 Thus, “measures taken in the framework of inter-
 
98 UN Charter, supra note 96, art. 55. 
99 Id. art. 56. 
100 Higgins and others, supra note 10, at 815. 
101 Jennings & Watts, supra note 45, at 988–989. 
102 Rüdiger Wolfrum & Eibe H Riedel, International Economic and Social Co-operation, Article 55(c), in Bruno 
Simma and others, supra note 97 at 1570. 
103 Id. at 1573. 
104 Id. 
105 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
March 23, 1976). 
106 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force January 3, 1976). 
107 ICCPR, supra note 105, art. 1(2); ICESCR, supra note 106, art. 1(2). 
108 Id. 
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State relations should not be such as to threaten starvation of the people of a State.”109 To the 
extent that economic sanctions breach that rule—and have the effect of threatening the 
starvation of a whole people—they are illegal under international law. In the description of 
one prominent author, “measures that tend to asphyxiate a country” are illegal.110 In 
principle, this can be the case only in extreme circumstances, and, as regards the UN Human 
Rights Conventions, where a State exercises control over the territory of another State, as 
further explained below.   
 
ICCPR 
For States Parties to the ICCPR, there are certain other specific obligations that may be 
potentially relevant to economic sanctions. Where, for example, such measures cause hunger 
and malnutrition which causes loss of life, it might be argued that the right to life under 
Article 6(1) of the Covenant is implicated. The Human Rights Committee has stated that: 
“The duty to protect life also implies that States parties should take appropriate measures to 
address the general conditions in society that may give rise to direct threats to life or prevent 
individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity.” It noted that “[t]hese general 
conditions may include …widespread hunger and malnutrition …”111  However, the question 
is whether and under which circumstances a State’s obligations under the ICCPR are extra-
territorial, such that it owes them to persons who are in the territory of another State. 
According to Article 2(1) of ICCPR, “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant”.112 
 
The ICJ has interpreted the term “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” under 
Article 2(1) to mean “‘covering both individuals present within a State’s territory and those 
outside that territory but subject to that State’s jurisdiction”.113  In this context, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has clarified that where a State party exercises jurisdiction over an 
individual, it may be responsible for extra-territorial violations only “if it is a link in the 
 
109 James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, UNILCOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 3, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/507, at 20, para 39 (2000). See also Eritrea v Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, 140 ILR 376 at 
396–97, paras 19, 21 (van Houtte, Aldrich, Crook, Paul, Reed, 2009). 
110 Philippe Cahier, Changement et continuité du droit international, 195 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 41 (1985). 
111 UNCCPR, General Comment No. 36: Article 6: right to life, CCPR/C/GC/36, 3 Sept., 2019, para 26. 
112 ICCPR, supra note 105, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
113 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
2004 ICJ REP. 136, 178–179 (Jul. 9, 2004). 
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causal chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction” such that “the risk 
of an extra-territorial violation must be a necessary and foreseeable consequence and must be 
judged on the knowledge the State party had at the time”.114  Determining the extent of extra-
territorial obligations “is a matter of determining which rights are applicable vis-à-vis the 
relevant state in the light of the nature and extent of the external exercise of that state’s public 
power.”115  
 
It would be difficult to conclude that the imposition of economic sanctions as such constitutes 
extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction. Whether and when a person that is outside a State’s 
territory is to be regarded as within the jurisdiction of the State is a vexed question on which 
differing views have been expressed by different human rights bodies and tribunals. It is, 
however, generally accepted that jurisdiction for these purposes simply means that the state 
exercises authority and control over the person, and for that reason owes them human rights 
obligations. Thus, in addition to the “spatial model” where a person falls within the 
jurisdiction of a State because they are in territory that is under the control of that State, 
jurisdiction can also be “personal” where an individual is “within the power or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.”116 All 
human rights bodies have accepted some form of the personal model of jurisdiction.117 What 
has remained unclear is precisely what form of authority, power or control would bring a 
person within the jurisdiction of the State. In its General Comment 36, the Human Rights 
Committee adopted the view that a State Party to the ICCPR has the obligation to respect and 
ensure the right to life to “all persons who are within its territory and all persons subject to its 
jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life it exercises power or 
effective control.”118 This is as far as any human rights body has been prepared to go. When 
this view is combined with the position that the right to life includes an obligation to protect 
from starvation one might begin to construct an argument that the imposition of sanctions 
could amount to a breach of the right to life under the ICCPR. The Human Rights 
Committee, however, was careful to stipulate that a person is only within the jurisdiction of a 
 
114 Munaf v. Romania, UNHRCOR, 96th Sess., Comm. No. 1539/2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 at 
para. 14.2. 
115 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 310 (2014). 
116 General Comment 31, at para. 10. 
117 Even the European Court of Human Rights, which has adopted the most restrictive view of “jurisdiction” of 
any of the international and regional human rights tribunals, accepts some form of the personal model of 
jurisdiction: Ukraine v Russia (re Crimea), Nos 20958/14 and 38334/18, December 16, 2020, para 303. 
118 General Comment 36, at para. 63 (emphasis added). 
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State as a result of control where the enjoyment of rights are affected by the States’ 
“activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner.”119 While it may be argued on this 
basis that imposing sanctions on another State might lead to economic problems which might 
lead to worsened circumstances which might in turn, in extreme circumstances, lead to 
starvation, it will be necessary to establish that this was a direct and foreseeable consequence 
of such measures. 
 
ICESCR 
The provisions of the ICESCR are more directly relevant to economic sanctions and 
frequently invoked by Venezuela in Referral II. Article 2(1) obliges States Parties “to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.120 This 
obligation of conduct is “programmatic and promotional,”121 and requires good faith efforts 
to realize progressively the relevant rights, rather than achieving a particular result. The ICJ 
has clarified that ICESCR guarantees rights that are “essentially territorial”, though “it is not 
be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to 
those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction”.122 The obligation to achieve, 
particularly by legislative measures, the full realization of the rights under the ICESCR is by 
its nature territorial in scope.123 In this regard, the leading commentary on ICESCR clarifies 
that: 
 
“While the subject of the potential for arguing that the ICESCR generally, and Article 
11 specifically, impose upon states extra-territorial responsibilities has gathered pace 
in recent years, the fact remains that in terms of legal obligation the Covenant, the 
Committee [on Economic Social and Cultural Rights] and the relevant [UN] Special 
Rapporteurs talk mainly in hope rather than expectation.”124  
 
 
119 Id. at para. 63 and also para 22. 
120 ICESCR, supra note 106, at art. 2(1). 
121 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles, supra note 85, at 614. 
122 The Wall, supra note 113, at para 112. 
123 This is explicable against the background of “the programmatic requirements for the fulfilment of this 
category of rights”: The Wall, supra note 113, at 213 (Higgins, J., sep. op.). 
124 BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES AND MATERIALS 967 (2014). 
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This is consistent with the ICESCR Committee’s observation that compliance with such 
obligations: 
 
“does not in any way call into question the necessity for the imposition of sanctions in 
appropriate cases in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
or other applicable international law.”125  
 
It notes however, though without specifying specific obligations, that the right of States to 
adopt such measures are not unlimited: 
 
“the inhabitants of a given country do not forfeit their basic economic, social and 
cultural rights by virtue of any determination that their leaders have violated norms 
relating to international peace and security. The aim is not to give support or 
encouragement to such leaders, nor is it to undermine the legitimate interests of the 
international community in enforcing respect for the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the general principles of international law. Rather, it is to insist 
that lawlessness of one kind should not be met by lawlessness of another kind which 
pays no heed to the fundamental rights that underlie and give legitimacy to any such 
collective action.”126 
 
Venezuela refers127 to a UN study by Marc Boussuyt,128 which recommends in general terms 
that unilateral sanctions should “meet all the requirements for such sanctions inherent in the 
[UN] Charter, including conformity with the principles of justice and international law”.129 In 
this regard, the leading ICESCR commentary observes that: 
 
“[e]ven economic sanctions are generally not treated as prohibited interventions under 
international law, despite attempts by developing states to change the law in that 
direction. … While various UN resolutions have attempted to prohibit economic 
coercion by unilateral sanctions, with many developing states supporting such efforts, 
there is strong opposition from certain developed countries which utilize such 
sanctions and thus insufficient consensus on a prohibition.”130 
 
Others similarly observe in respect of the ICESCR that: 
 
125 UNCESCR, General Comment No. 8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights, UNESCOR, 17th Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8, at para. 1 (1997). 
126 Id. at para 16. 
127 Referral II, supra note 14, paras. 49–51. 
128 Marc Bossuyt, The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights, 
UNESCOR, 52nd Sess, Agenda Item No 12, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (2000). 
129 Id. at para 40. 
130 Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, supra note 242, at 106–107. 
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“[t]he standard limiting embargoes or boycotts that harm the economic interests of the 
citizens of the target state is very permissive, because the background doctrine of 
national independence supports the freedom not to trade”.131  
 
It is thus very difficult to conclude as a general principle that sanctions would necessarily 
violate obligations under the ICESCR. Customary international law does not bar the use of 
economic coercion.132 In the absence of specific legal obligations to engage in trade with 
another State, an embargo will in principle be a lawful measure.133 Where general 
international law does impose a limit is in the extreme circumstance where unilateral 
sanctions rise to the level of depriving a people of its own means of subsistence or threatens 
the starvation of the people of a State.134 There is in general international law a “duty not to 
use economic coercion for the purpose of destroying or dismembering a State.”135 This would 
seem to be some way removed from the US sanctions against Venezuela, whether their 
ostensible objective is merely to confront human rights violations or to achieve “regime 
change”. In any event, aside from this specific factual context, what matters for present 
purposes is that conduct that is permissible under general or particular international law 
cannot qualify as crimes against humanity, as discussed in the following Section. 
 
III. SANCTIONS AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
 
Section 6 of Referral II is entitled “Crimes Against Humanity.”136 It asserts that the economic 
sanctions imposed on Venezuela qualify as crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the 
ICC Statute.  The present Section considers Venezuela’s arguments and whether they are 
consistent with international criminal law. 
 
Acts that are lawful under general international law cannot at the same time be crimes for 
which individuals, and particularly State officials, can be held responsible under international 
 
131 Mortimer NS Sellers, Economic Sanctions against Human Rights Violations, in Picchio Forlati & Sicilianos, 
supra note 12, at 485. 
132 Cleveland, supra note 47, at 53. 
133 Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 52, para. 37. 
134 ICCPR, supra note 105, art. 1(2); ICESCR, supra note 106, art. 1(2); James Crawford, Third Report on State 
Responsibility, UNILCOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 3, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507, at 20, para. 39 (2000). 
135 Brownlie, supra note 43, at 307. 
136 Referral II, supra note 14, paras. 31–51. 
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criminal law.  For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) has endorsed the view that:137 
 
“[i]t is a well-established truism in international law that if a given conduct is 
permitted by general or particular international law, that permissibility deprives the 
conduct of its criminal character under international criminal law. But if a given 
conduct is prohibited by general or particular international law it does not mean that it 
is criminal ipso jure. The problem thus lies in distinguishing between prohibited 
conduct which falls within the legally defined criminal category and that which does 
not.”138 
 
Accordingly, to the extent that sanctions are permitted by general or particular international 
law, as discussed above, those same acts cannot amount to crimes against humanity.  
Furthermore, even if they are unlawful, that does not necessarily mean that they constitute an 
international crime. 
 
It is important to note that, as recognized by the ILC Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, 
both States and individuals may be responsible for the commission of crimes against 
humanity.139  Furthermore, the Preamble to the ILC Articles recalls “that the prohibition of 
crimes against humanity is a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).” It 
would seem illogical to assert that acts which are permissible in international law, or in 
respect of which the worst that could be said is that there is a debate as to their lawfulness, 
constitute a violation of a peremptory norm. For a rule of international law to be part of jus 
cogens, it must be “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”140 Where an act is, by contrast, 
accepted as lawful by the international community, it cannot be said at the same time that the 
international community of States as a whole accepts a rule that such an act must not be 
performed and also that no derogation from such rule is permitted. 
 
 
137 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalić et al (Čelebići Camp Case), IT-96-21-T, Judgement (16 November 1998) at para 
406 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY 
<https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf> (endorsing the statement of the Chair of the 
Drafting Committee of the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court). 
138 MAHMOUD CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 113 (1992); 
see also LENA GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 161 (2014). 
139 Art. 3(1) ILC Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. A/74/10 (2019); Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 2019, vol. II, Part Two. 
140 Art. 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
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The principle that acts which are permitted under international law ought not to be regarded 
as crimes against humanity is reflected in the definition of a number of the specified acts 
which are prohibited as crimes against humanity. Where the particular type of act is by 
definition wrongful, for example, murder, extermination, enslavement, rape, the definition in 
the Rome Statute does not specifically refer to the fact that the act must not be unlawful 
under international law. This is understandable because such acts are mala in se (even if there 
can be questions as to whether a particular act falls within the definition of, say, murder). 
However, and by contrast, where the type of act is one which is not in itself wrongful, the 
Rome Statute (and customary international law) excludes from the definition of crimes 
against humanity those acts in that category which are lawful under international law. Thus, 
“deportation or forcible transfer of population” is a crime only where it is “without grounds 
permitted under international law”; “imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty” is 
only a crime only when committed “in violation of fundamental rules of international law”; 
and “persecution” occurs where there is “intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental 
rights contrary to international law.”141 
 
This inextricable relationship with general international law is a function of the prevailing 
view that “crimes against humanity as understood today are closely linked to the gradual 
expansion of international human rights law. In fact, the category of crimes against humanity 
has become the criminal law response to gross violations of human rights.”142 While this 
crime was included in the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”)  at 
Nuremberg143—and thus pre-dates the post-World War II human rights conventions—it is 
widely accepted, both in the jurisprudence144 and literature,145 that the protected interests 
 
141 See Arts. 7(2)(d); 7(1)(e); 7(2)(g), Rome Statute. See also Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, ICTY, March 22, 
2006, IT-97-24-A, para 302, making a similar point that under customary international law the crime of 
deportation occurs only where the forcible transfers is carried out without grounds permitted by international 
law. 
142 Jonas Nilsson, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 284, 287 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009). See also ANTONIO CASSESE AND OTHERS, CASSESE’S 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 92 (3rd ed., 2013) (“Indeed, while ICL concerning war crimes largely derives 
from, or is closely linked with, IHL, ICL concerning crimes against humanity is to a great extent predicated 
upon international human rights law.”). 
143 Art. 6(c), Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals o the European Axis, August 8, 1945, 82 UNTS 279, No. 251 
144 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, ICTY, March 22, 2006, IT-97-24-A, para 277: “The protected 
interests underlying the prohibition against deportation include the right of the victim to stay in his or her home 
and community and the right not to be deprived of his or her property by being forcibly displaced to another 
location. The same protected interests underlie the criminalisation of acts of forcible transfer, an “other 
inhumane act” pursuant to Article 5(i) of the Statute.” 
145 See de Guzman, Crimes Against Humanity in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
121 (Schabas & Bernaz ed., 2011) (“Crimes against humanity … owe strong allegiance to international human 
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underlying the criminal law prohibitions are the human rights of the victims. Indeed, in its 
1991 draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC even 
considered renaming “crimes against humanity” as “Systematic or mass violations of human 
rights.”146 One of the leading commentaries on the Rome Statute observes that:  
 
“Crimes against humanity might usefully be viewed as an implementation of human 
rights norms within international criminal law. Just as human rights law addresses 
atrocities and other violations perpetrated by a State against its own population, 
crimes against humanity are focused on prosecuting the individuals who commit such 
violations.”147  
 
Thus, in principle, economic sanctions would constitute crimes against humanity under 
international criminal law only where the acts amount to widespread or systematic violations 
of fundamental human rights under general international law. 
 
As Referral II notes, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) found that “decisions and polices violating the right to 
food, which were applied for the purposes of sustaining the current political system, in full 
awareness that such decisions would exacerbate starvation and related deaths of much of the 
population” amount to crimes against humanity.148 That finding was based on the fact that 
“relevant DPRK officials adopted a series of decisions and policies that violated international 
law and aggravated mass starvation.”149 It was noted in particular that there were deliberate 
“violations of the right to food and other human rights”150 and that the DPRK violated its 
obligations under Article 11(2) ICESCR to ensure “the fundamental right of everyone to be 
free from hunger” within its jurisdiction.151 This was obviously based on the fact that the 
violations took place on the territory of DPRK.  It would be an entirely different thing to hold 
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that a State has violated its human rights obligations and imposed starvation by virtue of its 
economic policies towards another State, the territory of which it does not occupy or 
otherwise control. As set out above, a State’s obligations to fulfil the right to food apply only 
within its territory, or otherwise, in cases where it exercises control over the territory of 
another State.152  
 
Referral II also invokes the jurisprudence of the IMT at Nuremberg in respect of deliberate 
starvation during Germany’s belligerent occupation of Poland. It maintains, in the context of 
a discussion of the “economic policies that result in shortages of food and medicine,” that 
there is nothing in the definition of crimes against humanity “that excludes the possibility that 
the policies of one State constitute an attack on a civilian population other than its own even 
when it does not exercise control over the territory.” This assertion, however, does not find 
support in international law, whether in general international law or in the provisions of the 
ICCPR or the ICESCR discussed above. Here, too, it may be recalled that, according to the 
ICJ, the ICESCR “guarantees rights which are essentially territorial,” applicable “to 
territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over which that State 
exercises territorial jurisdiction.” Where there is no legal obligation on States in respect of 
conduct relating to territories beyond their jurisdiction, it would be exceedingly difficult to 
conclude that the same conduct amounts to crimes against humanity.  
 
The foregoing observations on why lawful sanctions cannot fall within the definition of 
crimes against humanity follows from the requirement in the chapeau of Article 7(1) of the 
Rome Statute that such acts must be part of “a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population.”153 Article 7(2)(a) clarifies that this fundamental element of 
an “attack directed against any civilian population” “means a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts … [such as murder, extermination, enslavement, etc.] … 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”154  
International criminal tribunals, including the ICC, have held that for an attack to be directed 
against a civilian population, the civilian population must be the “primary object of the 
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attack,”155 rather than an incidental victim of the conduct in question.  As the ILC has 
observed: “the term ‘directed’ places its emphasis on the intention of the attack rather than 
the physical result of the attack.”156 
 
Thus, for instance, even if sanctions could qualify as murder, “the killing of only a select 
group of civilians—a number of political opponents to the regime—could not be regarded, in 
principle, as a crime against humanity; in such a case, no ‘population’ can be said to have 
been attacked.”157  In particular, where sanctions are directed primarily at the State 
leadership, it would be difficult to qualify such measures as an attack directed primarily 
against a civilian population, even if there are (very serious) adverse physical results for the 
population as a result.  In appropriate circumstances, however, sanctions directing an attack 
against a civilian population—including by means of deliberate starvation—in order to 
weaken or overthrow a government could qualify as crimes against humanity: this is 
connected inter alia to the principle of international law that “measures taken in the 
framework of inter-State relations should not be such as to threaten starvation of the people 





Venezuela’s Referral II raises questions with far-reaching implications on the scope of the 
rights and obligations of States. While the right to adopt sanctions is not unlimited, 
international law allows considerable freedom of action in respect of unilateral measures of 
this kind. Unilateral economic sanctions are not permitted by international law when they 
threaten starvation of the people of a State; but that will only be the case in extreme 
circumstances. As regards sanctions permitted by international law, which is the general 
position, there can be no basis for a conclusion that their imposition amounts to crimes 
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against humanity under Article 7 of the ICC Statute. Furthermore, even if the sanctions are 
not permitted under international law, there must be proof that they constitute an attack 
directed primarily against a civilian population. Absent these crucial elements, there would 
be no basis to conclude that “a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being 
committed” within the meaning of Article 53(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, and thus no basis for 
the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation. 
 
The paradox is that while sanctions could—in extreme circumstances such as deliberate 
starvation—result in violations of fundamental human rights obligations and even amount to 
crimes against humanity, they are often invoked in order to pressure States to respect human 
rights, or otherwise to cause a State to refrain from conduct that is deemed to be a threat to 
peace and security. Even those most critical of unilateral sanctions would find it difficult to 
argue, for instance, that such measures against the apartheid regime in South Africa were not 
permissible under international law. Whether in particular circumstances those motivations 
are genuine or not, the controversy in connection with “unilateral coercive measures” is an 
opposition between competing appropriations of human rights and international criminal 
law—as forcefully demonstrated by the contrast and sequence between Referral I and II. 
Whatever criticism may be levelled against US policy, however, Venezuela’s expansive 
arguments do not find support in international law. Attempts to weaponize accusations of 
crimes against humanity must be resisted by the ICC if it is to maintain its integrity as a 
judicial institution. This is so however much one might sympathize with the sentiment (with 
which the writers agree) that those who suffer most from sanctions tend to be “those whom 
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